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MAJOR THEMES IN THE EVOLUTION OF CANADIAN RENTAL HOUSING POLICY, 
1900-1984 
JOAN SELBY 
SCHOOL OF COMMUNITY AND REGIONAL PLANNING 
UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA 
There is widespread agreement among housing policy analysts 
that there is currently a serious problem with Canada's rental 
housing sector. This problem consists of three elements: 
persistently low vacancy rates; declining private sector rental 
starts, despite the low vacancy rates; and declining 
affordability of both new and existing private rental stock for 
a considerable ~tion of the low- and moderate-income renter 
population. This situation has prompted a debate as to whether 
the past and current approach to rental housing policy is 
appropriate to the solution of rental housing problems, or 
whether new or different strategies for addressing rental 
problems are warranted. 
This paper seeks to contribute to the current rental 
housing policy debate by providing an overview of three 
discrete, yet interrelated factors, which together have shaped 
-f 
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the rental housing policy-making environment in Canada over the 
course of the twentieth century. 
2 
The paper examines, first, a set of fundamental and rarely-
questioned assumptions. These assumptions relate to important 
questions about the appropriate role of government in housing, 
about the capacity of the private rental sector to meet Canada's 
rental housing needs, and about the role of rental tenure in our 
society. The paper argues that these assumptions have severely 
constrained rental policy and program options and have prevented 
the implementation of potentially more effective rental 
programs. These constraints on government rental policy have 
resulted in either the neglect of Canada's rental problems or 
the adoption of a variety of short-term, ad hoc programs in 
response to immediate crisis situations. The major constraints 
discussed in this paper include: the almost exclusive reliance 
on the private sector for housing supply and housing program 
delivery; the focus on home ownership as the desirable tenure 
option; the belief that severe housing problems are temporary 
aberrations rather than manifestations of fundamental, long-term 
problems; and the view·that housing is largely a local matter, 
with problems best left to the municipalities and provinces to 
sort out. 
The second factor examined is a set of opportunities for 
government intervention in the rental sector. The paper argues 
that in spite of the constraints, macro-economic circumstances 
as well as circumstances in the rental sector have forced 
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government to intervene from time to time for political, 
economic and social reasons. The opportunities for government 
intervention all relate to the poor performance of the private 
rental market throughout both the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. This poor performance has been manifested in three 
specific problem areas: the poor quality of much of the rental 
stock, especially early in this century; the insufficient supply 
of rental units; and the high cost of rental housing - the 
affordability problem. 
The third factor examined is the inadequate definition of 
the nature of the rental problem. Before deciding what to do 
about a problem, it is necessary to define what the problem is. 
This section reviews the specific types of activities the 
government undertook based on the way in which it chose to 
define rental sector problems. The paper argues that, because of 
the constraints outlined in Section 1 and due to the 
opportunities which made necessary some form of government 
action, as outlined in Section 2, a clearly sequential pattern 
can be identified in how the problem was defined. This means 
that the major elements 6f the rental housing problem - quality, 
supply and affordability - were treated in relative isolation of 
each other with the government continually failing to consider 
the interrelationships between them. Thus, while unlimited 
numbers of good quality rental units can now, in theory, be 
delivered, in practice the economic costs of supplying modern, 
urban rental housing far outpace the ability of many low- and 
moderate-income households to pay financial recovery rent 
levels. In effect, then, the quality and supply aspects of 
Canada's rental housing problem have not been "solved" as many 
suggest - they have simply been repackaged and subsumed under 
one major problem area, affordability. 
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1. CONSTRAINTS ON GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 
1A. Housing as a Market Commodity and the Role of the Private 
Sector in Housing Programs 
The first and probably major constraints on government 
intervention in the rental sector are adherence to the belief 
that housing is a market commodity whose provision is a private 
sector responsibility, and its corollary that the market is the 
best allocative mechanism. Accordingly, government involves 
itself in housing provision only in extraordinary or emergency 
circumstances, and only in order to aid the market rather than 
circumventing or competing with it. From this, it follows that 
when government must intervene, actors in the market place are 
used for program implementation. R.H. Winters, Minister 
responsibile for CMHC, noted in 1954, for instance: 
"The government ••. believes in making it possible for private 
enterprise to do as much of the job as possible and then -
and only then - for the state to participate." 1 
Similarly, in May 1985, at the annual meeting of. the Co-
operative Housing Foundation, current Housing Minister Bill 
McKnight remarked: 
"Government actions, where they may be required, should be 
directed to facilitating the operation of a free and 
competitive market, not impeding it." 2 
1 Canada, .House of Commons Debates (1954) Ottawa, p. 1574. 
2
"Remarks by the Honourable Bill McKnight" (1985) Co-operative 
Housing Foundation Annual Meeting, Calgary, May 23, p.4. 
5 
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This sanctity accorded the private housing market appears 
to be based on the theory of individualism which implies that 
the acquisition of housing is a personal responsibility. Thus, 
except in the case of a narrowly-defined group of "truly needy" 
(the elderly, mentally or physically disabled, and single 
parents on welfare), who are incapable of assuming such 
responsibility, an attempt is made to minimize the nature and 
extent of the government's role in the housing market. 
For Canadian housing policy, this underlying assumption has 
meant that government intervention in the housing market has 
generally been of an indirect, market-oriented nature and, 
particularly in the period before the 1960's, rationalized as a 
response to extraordinary circumstances. The 1919 Home Loans 
Program was a tool in post-war reconstruction, the 1935 Dominion 
Housing Act (DHA), the 1937 Home Improvement Loans Program, and 
the 1938 National Housing Act (NHA) were responses to the 
devastation of the Great Depression, and the 1944 NHA was aimed 
at post-war reconstruction. Moreover, the latter four 
interventions all relied on the private sector, with the aid of 
government loans or grants, for housing provision, as did the 
loan insurance introduced in the 1954 NHA and the majority of 
the housing programs adopted in the 1970's. 3 The nature of these 
interventions is indeed remarkable given widespread recognition 
among housing experts throughout the twentieth century of the 
3 See J.D. Hulchanski and B. Grieve, "Housing Issues and Canadian 
Federal Budgets, 1968 to 1984," UBC Planning Papers, CPI 1~, 
Vancouver: University of British Columbia. 
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need for major government intervention in the rental market, for 
the creation of a federal housing authority, and for public 
responsibility for low-rental housing provision. 
The federal government's direct intervention in the rental 
sector during World War II with the creation of Wartime Housing 
Limited (WHL) - a crown corporation engaged in constructing and 
managing temporary rental housing for war-industry workers - and 
the imposition of rent controls is an obvious exception to the 
pattern of indirect involvement, but the use of the War Measures 
Act to authorize WHL's activities had redefined the wartime 
housing shortage as a "war problem". 
Indeed, the government's perception of the wartime housing 
situation as an emergency is reflected in the following 1947 
statement by C. D. Howe, Minister responsible for WHL: 
"The aspects of population dislocation and emergency that 
characterized the needs of many war workers and justified the 
wartime housing program were also apparent among war veterans 
as soon as large-scale demobilization started .•• From this it 
is clear that the extent of the Dominion's direct 
participation in providing accommodation has been limited in 
scope and treated as an extraordinary provision." 4 
Moreover, as soon as the war ended, the government essentially 
reverted to its indirect position. WHL was dismantled, the 
31,000 housing units sold off, and CMHC was created "to 
stimulate the private sector to serve as large an area as 
4 C.D. Howe (1947) "Meeting Canada's Housing Needs," Public 
Affairs, 10(4), pp. 217-218. 
possible of the housing field." 5 
The public housing programs introduced in 1949 and 1964, 
and the social housing programs of 1973 and 1978 are also 
obvious exceptions. The government's lack of committment to 
these programs and the direct role they imply is manifest, 
however, in program underfunding- in 1981, public and non-
profit sector units represented only 2.8% of total Canadian 
housing stock. (See Table 1) Moreover, the programs have 
received only short-term, year-to-year funding committments, 6 
and have been designed to ensure the production of minimal, 
modest housing which poses no threat to private market supply. 7 
Even this relatively minor direct role appears to have 
8 
become unacceptable, however, as is evidenced by the appointment 
in 1979 of a Task Force on CMHC to study the potential for 
privatizing or at least encouraging the private sector to take a 
larger role in many CMHC activities. 8 Indeed, Paul Cosgrove, 
Minister responsibile for CMHC, confirmed the government's 
5 From a Memorandum to Cabinet, as cited in C.J. Wade (1984) 
"Wartime Housing Limited, 1941-1947: Canadian Housing Policy at 
the Crossroads," Masters Thesis, University of British Columbia, p. 150. 
6 M. Dennis and S. Fish (1972) Programs in Search of a Policy: 
Low-Income Housing Policy in Canada, Toronto: Hakkert, p. 14. 
7 From a February 12, 1957 letter to the President of CMHC from a 
senior government official and Board Member of CMHC, as cited in 
Dennis and Fish, Programs in Search, p. 174. 
8 Canada, Task Force on Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation 
(1979) Report on Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 
Ottawa: CMHC, p.2. 
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position with respect to the housing market in his keynote 
address at the 1981 All Sector Housing Conference: 
"The privat~ market is now the best tool for providing housing 
for most Canadians. The federal government is determined to 
let market forces operate for the broad majority of 
households who can afford to choose what the market 
offers •.• the best long-term course for all concerned is to 
let the market sort itself out." 9 
1B. Home Ownership as the Desirable Tenure Option 
A second constraint on government intervention in the 
rental sector is the reverence accorded home-ownership given its 
allegedly stabilizing effect on family life and society. Indeed, 
references to the stabilizing influence of home-ownership 
pervade both early and recent Canadian housing literature. In 
the Parliamentary debate over the 1919 housing bill, one Member 
of Parliament declared: 
"It is in the national interest that a man may have the 
opportunity to rear his family in a comfortable house of his 
own equipped with modern sanitary conveniences .•• [it] induces 
him to take more practical interest in the affairs of the 
country and thus tends to the strength and stability of our 
national life." 10 
In introducing the 1938 NHA, Finance Minister Dunning stated: 
"One of the great objectives [of this Act] is to co-operate ••• 
[with] those who •.. desire to own a home of their own, which 
is one of the most healthy aspirations in the breast of any 
man." 1 1 
9 Canadian Real Estate Association (1982) Housing in Canada: A 
Continuing Challenge, Report on the All Sector National Housing 
Conference in Ottawa, March 1981, Don Mills, Ont.: CREA, pp.13-
1 4. 
10Hansard, 1919, 2532-2533 
1 1 Commons Debates· ( 1938) June 8. 
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Similarly, during the debate over the 1954 amendments to the 
NHA, another M.P. warned: 
"If Canada is going to be great and strong •.• at home and 
abroad; if we are going to make a contribution to the world 
of today, then this nation of ours must be a nation of home-
owners."12 
Most recently, in defending the existence of tax provisions 
which favour home ownership over rental tenure, Housing Minister 
Bill McKnight told an annual conference of municipal officials 
that "as a society, we believe in and encourage home 
ownership" ••• and that any changes in the tax benefits to the 
ownership sector would "be unfair and counter to our strongly 
held belief in the value of home ownership." 13 
Relative to home ownership, rental tenure has enjoyed 
"second class" status in Canada. 14 Government housing policy has 
reflected this attitude. The response to the working-class 
housing problem of the 1910's and 1920's was to facilitate home 
ownership through the 1919 Home Loans Program. Even with the 
well-documented evidence of rental problems during the 1930's 
and clear indications that a majority of working-class 
households were incapable of financing even assisted home-
12Hansard, 1954, 1343 
13
"Remarks by the Honourable Bill McKnight" (1985) Annual 
Conference of Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association, 
January 28, pp. 9,10. 
14 See Rose, RP, 18; Steed, 15; LaBerge, 25; All Sector, Streuss, 
52; Flemming, 61; Dalzell, 19; HCSCH, 171 
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ownership, the 1935 and 1938 housing acts initiated only horne 
ownership assistance programs. The very modest low-rental 
provisions included in the 1938 NHA were never implemented. The 
1954 amendments to the NHA, which introduced mortgage insurance 
and permitted the chartered banks to lend on residential 
property, were designed to augment the supply of mortgage 
capital in order to render horne ownership accessible to more 
Canadians. Only during the 1970's did the goverrnent initiate 
several rental housing supply subsidy programs. These were 
outnumbered and outfunded, however, by a series of horne 
ownership subsidy and tax incentive programs including AHOP, 
RHOSP, CHOSP, CMRP, MRPP, and tax exemption of capital gains on 
principal residences. 15 Moreover, the potential long-term 
benefits of the rental programs were reduced by the registration 
of many subsidized private rental units as condominiums, which 
means they will eventually be removed from the rental stock. 
1C. The Housing Problem as a Temporary Aberration 
The contention that not only rental sector but housing 
problems in general are temporary follows from the belief in the 
efficiency of the market mechanism. Although there has been 
plenty of evidence suggesting that the problems experienced by 
working-class and low-income renters are chronic, the belief 
that short-term market imperfections or ephemeral macro-economic 
conditions are responsible for the problems has meant that 
15 See Hulchanski and Grieve, "Federal Budgets"; Arthur Andersen 
and Co. (1984) "Federal and Provincial Government Expenditures 
to Assist and Promote Rental Housing in Canada, 1976-1982." 
1 2 
government has consistently either not responded or responded 
with ad hoc, short-term interventions. In 1918, for instance, 
Thomas Adams suggested public assistance to the private sector 
appeared necessary until capital became more plentiful and 
private investment in building more secure. 16 The rental 
problems of the 1930's were rationalized as a product of the 
Depression, as the following remarks by a Liberal M.P. during 
the debate over the 1935 DHA suggest: 
"I should be very sorry to see the government go into a 
general policy of socialism based on the general conditions 
today. The fact there is a large number of people in Canada 
today who cannot provide proper housing for themselves does 
not in my opinion justify a policy for all time to meet those 
special conditions of today." 17 
Similarly, the rental problem of the World War II years was 
dubbed a "war problem" and would, according to C.D. Howe, 
ameliorate once the war ended and construction costs 
stabilized. 18 Thus the rental dwellings constructed by WHL were 
constructed as temporary units. Yet, by the 1970's, prohibitive 
financing and construction costs continued to thwart private 
sector construction, and the number of Canadians unable to 
afford adequate housing had reached unprecedented levels. The 
government's response to this situation was to implement 
temporary incentive programs. The Multi-Un1t Residential 
Building (MURB) program, for-instance, initially applied only to 
16 Cdn. Engineer, Vol. 35, 1918, 501 
17Hansard, 1935, 3773 
18Howe, 219 
rental construction undertaken between November, 1974 and 
December, 1975, although it was subsequently extended, almost 
annually, to the end of 1981. Similarly, the Assisted Rental 
Program (ARP) and the Canada Rental Supply Plan (CRSP) were 
temporary programs lasting three and two years, respectively. 
Not only have these short-term programs failed to address what 
is obviously a long-term problem, but they have tended to 
exaccerbate that problem by disrupting the market and creating 
instability. 19 A 1984 CMHC analysis of the rental market 
observed that the private sector incentive programs of the 
1 3 
1970's likely created disincentives for the market to adjust to 
changing conditions. 20 
1D. Provincial Jurisdiction over Housing 
Because Section 92 of the British North America (BNA) Act 
delegates responsibility for housing to the provinces, federal 
involvement in housing was slow to evolve. Only when it became 
apparent the provinces were financially incapable of coping with 
the ongoing housing problems did the federal government 
intervene. Even then, it was careful to require either 
provincial administration of housing programs, as with the 1919 
Housing Loans Program, provincial cost-sharing of the programs, 
19 See CREA, Housing in Canada, p. 152; Clayton Research 
Associates (1984) A Longer Term Rental Housing Strategy for 
Canada, Housing and Urban Development Association of Canada, pp. 
Iii, 12; "Remarks by Bill McKnight," CHF, p. 4; "Remarks by the 
Honourable Bill McKnight" (1985) Canadian Home Builders 
Assocation, National Conference, Ottawa, February 11, p. 9. 
2
°CMHC (1984) "An Analysis of the Rental Market," Ottawa: CMHC 
Planning Division, p. 24. 
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as with the 1949 and 1964 public housing programs, provincial 
enabling legislation, as with the 1938 and 1944 NHA's and the 
1949 public housing provisions, or local initiative for action 
as with the 1938 and 1949 rental programs. 
These requirements for bi- or tri-level co-operation on 
policy and programming have presented a serious obstacle to 
action. It has been suggested, for example, that the complexity 
of co-ordinating three levels of government was likely a factor 
in the sparing use of the 1949 public housing provisions by the 
municipalities. 21 Moreover, when the federal government 
preferred not to act at all, the constitution provided a 
convenient excuse. In defending federal failure to include 
rental provisions in the 1935 DHA, for example, the federal 
Minister responsibile for the Act observed: 
"In view of the fact that the provision of low-rental housing 
is primarily a municipal and provincial responsibility, the 
Dominion government did not feel justified in 
proceeding ••• without a further examination of municipal and 
provincial plans for low-rental housing and slum 
clearance." 22 
Similarly, in defending the federal government's failure to 
include a low-rental public housing program in the 1944 NHA or 
21 The Toronto Housing Authority was required to go through fifty 
steps, back and forth between the three levels of government, 
before it was authorized to proceed with one public housing 
project. A. Rose (1980) Canadian Housing Policies, 1935-1980, 
Toronto: Butterworth's, p. 34. 
22 Clark, 1937, The Housing Act, p 37 Interestingly, provincial 
responsibility for housing did not appear to be an obstacle to 
the home-ownership provisions of the DHA. 
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to continue the operation of Wartime Housing Limited in the 
post-war years, C.D. Howe remarked in 1947: 
"Since housing is a function of property and civil rights, a 
matter within the jurisdiction of provincial and municipal 
governments, direct participation by the Dominion in a 
housing program is circumscribed .•. Where the subsidization of 
low-rental housing is necessary or desirable it is rightly a 
responsibility of municipal and provincial authorities." 23 
The one time the federal government did take direct, unilateral 
action on rental problems - during and immediately following 
World War II - the provinces acquiesced given the "emergency" 
circumstances. 
In the past several years, even the indirect federal role 
has increasingly devolved to the provinces. Currently, 
negotiations are under way to transfer the last vestiges of 
federal rental policy - the social housing programs - to 
provincial administration. 24 
23 Howe, 217, 220 
24 Communigue, July 4, 1985 
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2. OPPORTUNITIES FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 
In spite of the constraints on government housing activity, 
economic and political realities have required government to 
intervene. The primary opportunity for government intervention 
is the private rental market's poor performance for much of the 
twentieth century. This poor performance is manifested in a set 
of three inter-related rental problems areas which have been 
well-documented and debated over the century: the poor quality 
of the rental stock, the insufficient supply of rental 
dwellings, and the inaffordability of the rental stock for many 
tenants. These rental problems have been most pronounced among 
lower-income households. 25 
Even given the severity of rental problems and the 
political and economic imperatives for government action, 
however, intervention in the rental market has been of a rather 
minimal and ad hoc nature because of the constraints and because 
the lower-income households who have experienced the problems 
most keenly are relatively unorganized and politically impotent. 
The intervention has been carried out without significant 
political and institutional change and, whenever possible, with 
minimal violation of the four principles articulated in Section 
1. In fact, "cautious crisis management" appears to be a fitting 
description of the Canadian governmnent's record of intervention 
25 Reports of the 1930's; Carver, 121.-122; Curtis, 14,110; CMHC 
Brief, 24 
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in rental housing. 
2A. Quality 
The apalling living conditions of the urban working-class 
were first widely publicized by the public health movement of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 26 The unco-
ordinated and speculative development pattern of Canadian cities 
had resulted in the concentration of working-class households in 
central slums or peripheral shanty towns characterized by poor 
sanitary conditions, a lack of basic water and sewer services, 
periodic outbreaks of contagious diseases, and high mortality 
rates. A 1911 Health Department Survey in Toronto, for instance, 
revealed: 
"homes in cellars, lanes, stables and shacks, where adults and 
children mingled with chickens and cows; where the number of 
lodgers or family [sic] outnumbered the beds; where thousands 
of families lived without drains or drainage, and people 
outnumbered baths five to one; and where high rents seemed 
matched only by high disease rates." 27 
Similarly, Dr. Charles Hodgetts, Medical Advisor to the Public 
Health Committee of the federal Commission of Conservation, 
wrote of Canadian slums in the Commission's Second Annual Report 
in 1911: 
26 Post-1895 studies of urban working-class living conditions 
were conducted by Montreal Businessman Herbert Ames, child 
welfare advocate, J.J. Kelso, Winnipeg clergyman and social 
reformer, J.S. Woodsworth, Toronto reformer, Bryce Stewart, and 
the Labour Gazette. See also Canada, Commission of Conservation 
(1911) Second Annual Report, Montreal: John Lovell & Son., Ltd., 
p. 53. 
27 As cited in Saywell, 117 
LIBRARY 
~STITUTE OFURBAN STUDIES 
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1 8 
"Indeed, all is dilapidation, decay and desolation. The 
environment reeks with the odours of successive strata of 
dirt, household refuse, and domestic slops, while the walls 
are cracked, and stairways rickety and unsafe, narrow and 
dark. The houses are often without cellars, are low and damp, 
being sometimes built flat upon the ground~ while darkened 
rooms, inaccessible to sunlight, add a sombre hue to a 
condition which can only be summed up as 'damnable' ." 28 
The wretched living conditions of the working-class were 
also documented by a 1919 federal Royal Commission on Industrial 
Relations, two Nova Scotia Royal Commissions on mining in 1920 
and 1926, in A.G. Dalzell's 1928 study on the housing conditions 
of the working-class and in a number of major housing reports of 
the 1930's and 1940's. The most notable of the later reports 
include the 1934 Report on Housing Conditions in Toronto, 
commissioned by Lt. Gov. Bruce (the Bruce Report), the 1935 
Report on Housing and Slum Clearance for Montreal, sponsored by 
the Montreal Board of Trade and the City Improvement League, the 
1935 report of the Special Parliamentary Committee on Housing, 
and the 1944 report of the Housing and Community Planning 
Subcommittee of the federal Advisory Committee on Reconstruction 
(the Curtis Report). These reports confirmed the continued 
existence of slum neighbourhoods containing thousands of 
overcrowded dwellings characterized by dampness, filth, and 
vermin, and failing to meet even minimum health standards for 
fresh air, sunlight, adequate water and sewer services, and food 
storage. 29 Furthermore, the 1944 Subcommittee Report noted that 
28 Commission of Conservation, Second Report, p.53 
29 Bruce, 35. 
given the reduced maintenance on all housing during the 
depression years of the 1930's, 
"With very few exceptions •.• the conclusions reached by the 
[1935] Parliamentary Committee are as valid for rental 
housing in 1943 as they were in 1935, the situation having 
become actually worse in most cities than it was ten years 
ago."3o 
With the gradual imposition of health and construction 
standards, the general quality of the rental housing stock 
1 9 
improved, especially in the post-war period. By 1974, less than 
12% of rental dwellings were found to be in poor external 
condition. 31 Even in the 1960's and 1970's, however, residual 
pockets of nineteenth and early twentieth century slum dwellings 
remained in evidence in large urban centers, while much rural 
and native housing still remains in-extremely poor condition. 
2B. Supply 
The reports produced by the public health movement around 
the turn of the century documented a serious shortage of 
adequate and affordable working-class rental housing. Despite 
the construction booms of the pre-World War I period, the 
1920's, and the 1950's, a severe shortage not only of low-rental 
units but of rental units in general persisted well into the 
1960's. 
The major reports of the 1930's provide evidence of the 
3
°Curtis, 35 
31 Rose, CHP, 169 
20 
severity of rental overcrowding in Canadian cities. According to 
evidence presented before the 1935 Parliamentary Committee, 
Montreal alone required 25,000 to 35,000 flats or apartments in 
1935 just to keep up with population increases, 32 with 4,000 of 
those required for low-income renters. 33 Winnipeg suffered a 
1,500-2,000 low-rental shortfall in 1935, 34 while Vancouver 
required an additional 12,000 low-rental dwellings. 35 Thus 
considering only three of Canada's larger urban centers in 1935, 
low-rental needs stood as high as 18,000 units, and were 
undoubtedly much higher on a national scale. In fact, the 1944 
Curtis Report recommended a minimum annual urban construction 
target of 15,000 low-rental units in the post-war decade to 
eliminate the existing urban backlog, to replace scattered 
obsolete units, and to meet additional requirements. 36 
Unfortunately, figures documenting the general rental 
shortage of the 1930's and 1940's are not readily available. 
Nevertheless, a 1949 article in the Financial Post suggested 
that a shortage of rental housing, particularly in the low- to 
medium-rent range, was a general condition in the larger 
32 HCSCH; Rancourt, 226. Montreal, however, is somewhat atypical 
of large Canadian centers given the high rates of tenancy in the 
province as a whole. 
33 HCSCH, Nobbs, 33 
34HCSCH, Officer, 175 
35Hansard, 1938, 325 Figure is for 1938. 
36 Curtis, 152 
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Canadian cities, 37 while a 1955 article in the Monetary Times 
documented the impossibility of finding any type of rental unit 
in Winnipeg, Regina, Saskatoon, and Edmonton. 38 
Moreover, any progress made on relieving the shortage 
during the apartment construction boom of the 1960's and early 
1970's was more than offset by record rates of population growth 
and family formation, and by the size of the accumulated 
construction deficit. By the 1970's and 1980's, apartment 
vacancy rates had dipped to record levels and were approaching 
zero in some large centers. 39 Indeed, the federal minister 
responsible for housing in 1975 described the rental housing 
situation at that time as the "closest thing approaching a 
crisis which confronts us," 40 and a delegate at the 1981 All 
Sector Housing Conference reported the rental housing shortage 
to be unparalleled in the history of the nation. 41 
This apparently chronic shortage of rental dwellings in 
Canada derives from a number of difficulties inherent in 
virtually exclusive reliance on the private sector for rental 
supply. In the first place, the private sector's capacity to 
supply not only a sufficient number of rental dwellings to meet 
demand but dwelling units of any description was clearly 
37 Rents to Rise, Fin. Post, 1 
38 House and Apt. Const. Boom., Mon. Times, 52 
39 All Sector, Foreward, 11 
40 1975 Hansard, 719 
41 All Sector, 155 
22 
inadequate until the 1960's. Continual shortages of manpower, 
materials and mortgage funds, particularly during and after the 
two world wars and during the Great Depression, maintained 
production at relatively low levels until the 1960's. In the 
post-World War II period, additional factors such as the 
shortage of serviced land and the obsolete building practices of 
an industry which had essentially lain dormant for a generation 
further thwarted accelerated production. Thus as Table 2 
indicates, the shortfall of dwellings increased dramatically 
from 84,000 units in 1901 to 145,000 in 1921, and reached a peak 
of 407,000 units in 1949. 
The second difficulty reliance on the private sector 
presents for rental housing supply is that sector's almost 
exclusive focus on the construction of units for owner-
occupiers. As Figure 1 indicates, aside from a relatively minor 
apartment construction boom between 1923 and 1929, which 
accounted for 15 to 18% of all residential construction during 
the period, 42 the construction and design of dwellings intended 
specifically for multi-family rental occupancy remained at very 
low levels for the first sixty years of this century. As a 
result, until the apartment booms of the late 1950's and the 
1960's, renters were forc~d to rely primarily on the conversion 
of older single-family dwellings to multi-family use, or the 
42 Saywell, 164-165; HCScH, 199. 
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"filtering down" of older, often substandard, 43 units for a 
supply of rental housing. 44 
A third supply-related difficulty with reliance on the 
private sector for housing provision is that the supply of units 
is completely dependent on macro-economic conditions, the boom-
bust business cycle, and the profit motive rather than on need 
or often even effective demand. Following World War I, for 
example, when war veterans were returning home and seeking 
housing, and again during the Great Depression when rural people 
were migrating to larger centers in search of employment (and 
consequently housing), private sector residential construction 
virtually ceased. Similarly, from 1973 onwards, rental 
construction has declined consistently, except for a few spurts 
of activity resulting from government incentive programs, 
despite tremendous need for affordable rental housing. (See 
Figure 1) By the 1980's, in fact, when rental vacancy rates were 
at an all-time low, many large private developers were leaving 
the rental construction business in favour or more profitable 
single-family dwelling, condominium, commercial or industrial 
development, leaving behind them a largely comatose private 
rental sector. 
2C. Affordability 
Documentation of serious housing affordability problems 
43 HCSCH, Cauchon, 48. As well, many of the substandard dwellings 
recorded in the 1951 Census were initially single-family units 
which had been converted to multi-family use. CMHC Brief, 30 
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among working-class households was first made in the 1886 report 
of a federal Royal Commission investigating the conflict between 
labour and capital, and in the reports prepared by the public 
health reformers at the turn of the century. Lower-income 
affordability problems subsequently became a major theme of 
housing reports and conferences over the course of the twentieth 
century. 
Aggregate statistics, though not an entirely reliable 
measure of reality, provide some indication of the extent of 
rental affordability problems for employed working-class and 
lower-income households since the turn of the century. In an 
article on early Toronto civic affairs, historian John Weaver 
reports that, in terms of real, wages, rents escalated by 60-70% 
between 1900 and 1913. 45 By the 1930's, average rent levels in 
existing modern apartments in Canada ranged from $20 to $30 per 
month, 46 with rents in the few new units being produced as high 
as $35. 47 Yet according to the major reports of the 1930's, 
semi-skilled and unskilled urban wage-earners could afford rent 
levels of no more than $9 to $15 per month at the then-accepted 
20% rent-to-income ratio. 48 Even the rents in Toronto Housing 
Company units, which received some assistance from the 
45 Weaver, To. Civic Affairs, 63 
46 HCSHC, Cauchon, 24, Bruce, 63-64 
47 Commons Special Committee, Minutes, p. 37. 
48 This is based on average wage levels of $500-800/year. See 
HCSHC,13, 33, 106, 236~ LSR, 11, 22, 27~ Bruce, 115-116; 
Montreal Report, 13, as cited in Grauer, 58. 
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municipality and other sponsor organizations, ranged from $23 to 
$40 per month, 49 and some units failing to meet even minimum 
health standards and lacking minimal amenities were renting for 
up to $30 to $45 per month in some urban centers. 50 Given these 
figures, households hoping to occupy even an average-priced 
existing rental unit required an annual income of $1,200 to 
$1,800 if they were not to exceed the 20% rent-to-income ratio. 
Yet, 1931 Census figures indicate that 56.2% of Canadians at 
that time earned less than $1,000 per year. 51 
Similarly, in the 1950's, average rent levels in larger 
centers ranged from $75 to $155 per month, 52 while 53% of urban 
households earned less than $2,500 per year and were thus unable 
to afford more than $42 per month. 53 
CMHC figures on national shelter costs and family income 
suggest that with the apartment construction boom of the 1960's, 
rental housing for the average family actually became more 
affordable during the 1960's and 1970's. 54 The figures conceal, 
however, the real affordability problems faced in some 
49 Bruce, 75;HCSCH, Ivey, 185. 
50 Bruce, 63; HCSCH, Officer, 172; Nobbs, 36 
51 As cited in LSR, 16; Excludes farm labourers. 
52 Tracey, LR Hsg, 34; Want to Rent, Fin. Post, 13 
53 CCL Brief, 93 
54 1978, Projecting, 15. Average rent-income ratios, for example, 
dropped to 17.9% in 1972 from 18.3% in 1962, and declined even 
further to 16.3% in 1976. (1977, Smith, Anat, 13) 
geographic areas and by some groups, particularly large 
families, senior citizens, and other traditionally low-income 
groups. In the early 1970's, for instance, the average rent 
level paid in Canadian urban centers was $120 per month, 55 
although rents were significantly higher in the larger urban 
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areas like Toronto where older, one-bedroom units in the central 
city commanded average rents of $185 per month. 56 First and 
second quintile households, however, could afford, on average, 
only $38.70 and $94.60 per month, respectively, at the then-
accepted 25% rent-to-income ratio. 57 By 1981, the average rent 
paid in Canada was $296 per month, 58 although average rents on 
new two bedroom units ranged from $500 to $666 per month, 59 with 
many in the larger urban centers in the $800 per month and above 
range. 60 Yet the upper limits for first and second quintile 
renter households, even at the newly-accepted 30% rent-to-income 
ratio, were $173 and $303 per month, respectively. 61 
The options for lower-income renters faced with such 
affordability problems have always been few and unattractive. 
55 CMHC, Projecting, 15 
56 1972, Fin. Post, Food and Hsg. 8 
57 Based on average annual income levels of $1,858 and $4,541. 
Dennis/ Fish, 1969 figures, 60 
58 1984, CMHC, RM anal, 7 
59 1982, Green, RC's Tighten; 517; All Sector, Duncan, 203 
60 Shortell, Fin. Post, Higher Rents, C18 
61 Based on 1980 upper annual income limits for renter 
householods of $6,900 and $12,100. Clayton, RH Strat, 6. 
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One option is to double-up with others in otherwise unaffordable 
units in order to reduce housing expenses, a recourse which 
simply serves to lower the living standard of all concerned. Yet 
many renters, particularly in the years before and during World 
War II, did double up. In fact, the number of households without 
units of their own was almost double the actual shortfall of 
dwelling units during the late 1920's and early 1930's -
probably an indication of an affordability problem. (See Table 
2) Similarly, CMHC estimates suggest that in both 1951 and 1964, 
500,000 households remained doubled-up 62 - most of .them because 
of affordability problems. 63 
A second option for low-income renters, and again one used 
extensively in the pre-World War II era, is to retreat to those 
substandard units which can be acquired at affordable levels. 
Indeed, documentation at various times throughout the century 
has illustrated a close correlation between income and housing 
conditions. In an article on early housing reform in Toronto, 
for example, Shirley Spragge suggests that the working-class's 
inability to afford either home-ownership or adequate rental 
housing was obviously the major factor in their occupation of 
substandard housing in the early years of the century. 64 
Moreover, the 1944 Curtis Report noted that during the 1930's, 
62 Nicholson, 6; Across, Can, "Amend To", 229; Firestone, 
Snowballing, fin post, 13; Bates, 261 
63 Dube, 48; CCL Brief, 91 
64 Spragge, 251 
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low-rents were being charged on many units solely for the 
purpose of securing tenants for substandard and slum dwellings 
which otherwise would have remained vacant. 65 
A final option for lower-income renters faced with 
affordability problems is to spend a disproportionate percentage 
of income to secure adequate housing. Doing so, however, reduces 
the amount of income available to acquire other basic 
necessities such as food and clothing, and can lead to poverty-
related social problems. 66 Nevertheless, the record of renter 
households paying excessive portions of income for housing is 
long. As early as 1913, renters were reported to be paying on 
average 25% of family income to secure adequate housing, 67 
although the then-accepted rent-to-income ratio was between 1/10 
and 1/8 of gross family income. 68 By 1931, the averag~ rent-to-
income ratio for employed wage-earners had risen to 30%, 69 and 
65 Curtis, 241 
66 HCSCH, Cauchon, 19; Mont. Report, 35 as cited in LSR, 457 The 
conventional levels chosen for rent-to-income ratios are, of 
course, arbitrary. In addition, they ignore that there is a 
critical income level below which even the accepted ratio 
becomes too high without causing deprivation of other basic 
necessities of life. (Carver, 79) 
67 Spragge, 249 
68 Fripp, 1277 
69 Calculated from average working-class wage and average monthly 
market rent figures in F. H. Leacy (1983) Historical Statistics 
of Canada, 2e. Ed., Ottawa: Statistics Canada and Social Science 
Federation of Canada, Series E41-48; Canada, Dominion Bureau of 
Statistics (1931) The Canada Year Book: The Official Statistical 
Annual of the Resources, History, Institutions and Social and 
Economic Conditions of Canada, Ottawa: King's Printer. 
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the accepted ratio to 20%. The 1944 Curtis Report's 
documentation that 89% of lower-tercile renters and 50% of 
middle-tercile renters were paying in excess of 20% of income 
for rent suggested the affordability problem had extended to 
moderate-income renters as well. 70 In 1976, 23% of renters 
overall, and 57% and 36% of first and second quintile renters 
continued to spend disproportionate percentages of income to 
secure adequate accommodation. 71 
The major factor underlying rental affordability problems 
throughout the twentieth century has been the private sector's 
inability to construct housing for lower-income and, 
increasingly, even moderate-income renters while maintaining a 
reasonable profit level. As early as 1919, an Ontario Housing 
Committee Report noted the gap between the costs of constructing 
and maintaining satisfactory dwellings and rent levels 
affordable to working-class households, and concluded: 
" ••• private enterprise cannot be depended on to meet the 
existing demand as the returns on the present cost of 
building are not adequate to the outlay." 72 
An article appearing in a 1921 issue of Town Planning and 
Conservation of Life was even more pessimistic regarding private 
sector capabilities in reporting: 
"The Philadelphia Chapter of the American Institute of 
7
°Curtis, 14 
71 CMHC, TF, 33-35 
72 As cited in Jones, 7 
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Architects, a body to which not [a] taint of radicalism has 
ever attached, has lately declared that houses for those who 
earn low wages can no longer be built anywhere in the world 
at a cost which will permit them to be either sold or rented 
without loss, and that it is unquestionably true than an 
industrial system, or even any particular industry, which 
fails to make possible adequate shelter, food, clothing, and 
recreation for all of its operatives is unworthy to exist. 
The Chapter proposes that housing for those earning low wages 
or salaries be legalized as a public utility; that the 
manufacture of this class of hames as a profitable industry 
shall cease in theory as it has already ceased in fact; and 
that the Government, national and local, should at once adopt 
measures making possible this prime necessity of life." 73 
Thirty years later, housing analyst Leonard Marsh presented 
data demonstrating that the provision of low- and even moderate-
income housing was not a commercial proposition, particularly if 
it was to meet decent standards, and he suggested the gap 
between commercial feasibility and income structure was greater 
than ever before. 74 By the late 1950's and early 1960's, the 
private rental sector was deemed ineffective in housing the 
lowest one-half of the income range (and thus a portion of even 
middle-income households), 75 prompting an American housing 
expert to warn at an Ontario Conference of Real Estate Boards in 
1956: 
" ••• except for the higher income group, the apartment house is 
becoming obsolete." 76 
73
"Housing as a Public Utility," Town Planning and Conservation 
of Life, January-March, 1921, p. 19. 
74Marsh, Economics of LR Hsg, 31 
75Murray, 43; Jones, The Role of P/E, 215 
76 James C. Downs, Housing and Redevelopment Co-ordinator, City 
of Chicago and President of the Real Estate Research 
Corporation. As cited in House and Apt. Boom, Mon. Times, 54 
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3. INADEQUATE DEFINITION OF THE NATURE OF THE RENTAL PROBLEM 
Historically, the rental sector in Canada has been plagued 
by an inadequate supply of good quality, affordable housing. 
From the reports of the early public health reformers and the 
Royal Commissions of the late 1910's and 1920's, through to the 
writings of housing reformers in the 1960's, the co-existence of 
the three elements of the rental problem has been documented. 
However, because of the assumptions outlined in Section 1, and 
because those responsible for developing rental policy failed to 
make the connection between the three problem areas, a long-
term, comprehensive rental policy did not evolve. Instead, 
Canadian rental policy has consisted of a series of ad hoc, 
short-term programs which have focussed on the three key problem 
areas in a clearly sequential manner. This latter statement does 
not imply exclusive treatment of any of the three elements of 
the problem at any one time. Indeed, there has been a great deal 
of overlap in problem treatment, especially during transition 
periods between the government's focus on one or another 
element. The government's primary focus, however, has been 
sequential with poor housing conditions largely commanding 
attention in the early years, inadequate supply in mid-century, 
and the affordability issue most recently. 
3A. Quality 
The first of the rental problem areas to be tackled was the 
poor quality of much of the .rental stock. Given the confidence 
placed in the market's allocative capability, government action 
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was apparently based on the belief that with the improvement of 
housing conditions, the rental problem would be solved. The 
connection between poor housing conditions and poverty was not 
made, 77 although a number of later studies contained references 
to the apparent correlation between the two. 78 
Intervention in issues relating to the quality of the 
housing stock originated largely as a municipal and provincial 
activity, and was initially facilitated not through housing-
specific programs but through public health reform and town 
planning. Recognizing that their success in combatting existing 
urban health problems and in eliminating the causes of bad urban 
conditions was heavily dependent on the active support of 
government, early public health reformers agitated for municipal 
action in establishing minimum standards of health and hygiene 
with respect to basic living conditions. They were initially 
impeded in their attempts to secure government action by a 
number of circumstances, including engineering and technical 
difficulties, 79 and the relatively small tax base of the 
municipalities. Even more important was the lack of precedent in 
Canada for government intervention into matters involving 
individual responsibility or individual and property rights. It 
took over fifty years in Ontario for the reformers to establish 
77 Spragge, 251 
78 Reports of the 1930's~ Carver, 121-·122~ Curtis, 14,110; CMHC 
Brief, 24 
79 JDH, Thesis, 23 
that the state not only had a right but a duty to intervene to 
eliminate conditions detrimental to public health. 80 
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Eventually, the provinces involved themselves in regulating 
urban health conditions. The Ontario government led the way with 
its 1884 Public Health Act. This Act obliged Ontario 
municipalities to establish health bureaucracies to deal with 
health matters, and eventually they did begin to pass nuisance 
laws, regulate privy pits, and monitor lodging houses for 
overcrowding. 81 Other provinces followed suit. 82 Action to 
improve the actual housing conditions of the working-class, or 
to augment the supply of adequate working-class housing, 
however, was not forthcoming, perhaps, as Weaver suggests, 
because the improvement of working-class housing conditions 
implied a great expense with far fewer returns to the powerful 
middle-class than did public health measures. 83 
Later, reformers pressed for a federal role in regulating 
urban health conditions, if only as co-ordinator for the various 
municipal schemes. This demand was, in some ways, satisfied by 
the creation in 1909 of the Commission of Conservation, a 
federal advisory body concerned with the preservation of human 
and natural resources. Although the BNA Act precluded direct 
80 JDH, THesis, 13 
81 Spragge, 249; Andrews, 19 
82Manitoba in 1909, and Saskatchewan in 1910 
83Weaver, TO Civic AFfairs, 67; Weaver, Shaping, 29 
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federal activity on public health and urban matters, the 
Commission functioned, in part, to promote provincial action on 
urban problems. 84 
Efforts to involve government in regulating housing quality 
were given a boost by the emergence, in the 1900's, of the town 
planning movement. Dedicated to the improvement of urban living 
conditions, and inspired by the arrival in Canada in 1914 of 
Thomas Adams to direct the newly-established Town Planning 
branch of the Commission of Conservation, early Canadian 
planners sought solutions to health, housing and traffic 
problems, with the amelioration of working-class housing 
problems as their first priority. 85 To accomplish their goals, 
they advocated the use of zoning to regulate land use, the 
imposition of construction standards and height restrictions to 
control density and ensure the penetration of adequate sunlight 
and fresh air to dwelling units, and the development of planned 
suburbs of single-family, detached owner-occupied housing to 
eradicate urban working-class slums. The profession was 
ultimately successful in prompting town planning legislation. 
Between 1910 and 1918, several provinces passed planning-related 
legislation to provide their municipalities with wider powers to 
regulate subdivision development. 86 
84 JDH, Thesis, 31 
85 Van Nus, 1977, 171-172 
86 Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Ontario, Saskatchewan, Alberta, 
and Manitoba. 
35 
The implementation of public health regulations and town 
planning measures undoubtedly helped to alleviate some of the 
worst urban health conditions and to facilitate healthier and 
more orderly urban development. They were so successful, in 
fact, that by 1976, only 3% of the Canadian housing stock lacked 
running water, sanitary facilities, or central heating, and less 
than 5% of Canadian households were living in overcrowded 
conditions. 87 
Nevertheless, the regulations were not, as the early 
reformers had hoped, a panacea to urban living conditions, and 
particularly to working-class housing problems, especially 1n 
the earlier years. One reason was that home ownership was not 
the solution to the housing problems of most lower-income wage-
earners. The combination of high prices for land, construction, 
and materials and unsteady employment had traditionally made the 
procurement of a downpayment impossible for many working-class 
families, and regular mortgage payments difficult. (See Table 3) 
As a result, the middle- and upper-classes proceeded to occupy 
the newer suburban homes, 88 while the working-class remained in 
overcrowded and often substandard inner-city tenements. 
Secondly, enforcement of the regulations proved difficult 
in that condemnation and closure of unfit housing was bitterly 
87 Task Force on CMHC, Report, p. 30. 
88 Rutherford, 375 
and often successfully resisted by property owners and 
developers. Yet without enforcement, much new construction 
continued to be of a shoddy nature. Overcrowding and poor 
maintenance ensured that it rapidly degenerated into slums. 
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Finally, and most importantly, successful enforcement of 
the regulations and standards, when it was achieved, intensified 
supply and affordability problems. By raising construction 
costs, enforcement discouraged new private investment and the 
conversion of older single-family units for multi-family use. 89 
It also rendered any new housing produced unaffordable to many 
working-class households who were forced either to pay excessive 
proportions of income for rent, to double-up, or to remain in 
substandard housing. Moreover, with the eventual elimination of 
poor quality rental housing, this latter option was precluded, 
causing further exaccerbation of the affordability problem. 
The persistence of urban slum conditions well into the 
1960's and the obvious financial impediments to more 
comprehensive and sustained provincial and municipal action have 
resulted in almost continual pressure since the 1930's for 
comprehensive, federal action on slum clearance and 
rehabilitation of salvagable rental units falling below health 
and amenity standards. Reformers have also pressed for the 
establishment of a federal housing authority with powers to 
impose quality standards on private development and to 
89Weaver, Tomm. Metro, 408 
facilitate the integration of town planning principles with 
housing development. 
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Federal response to the problem of poor quality rental 
housing has, however, been minimal. Aside from the introduction 
of a narrowly-conceived and thus scarcely-used $20 million slum 
clearance program in 1944, a concerted federal attack on the 
scattered pockets of urban slum housing was not made until the 
1960's. In 1960, home improvement loans were extended to rental 
housing, and in 1964, federal grants for the preparation and 
implementation of "urban renewal" schemes were introduced. The 
1964 program did stimulate municipal and provincial action on 
slum clearance, but because the municipalities were not required 
to redevelop cleared land as residential areas, and because much 
of the clearance was carried out insensitively, the benefits to 
lower-income households were limited. Moreover, because slum 
housing was destroyed faster than alternate housing was 
provided, 90 the program served to exaccerbate the low-rental 
supply problem. 
As a result, the urban renewal program was suspended 1n 
1969, and replaced in 1973 by two programs designed to 
facilitate more selective redevelopment and more extensive use 
of rehabilitation and conservation measures. The Neighbourhood 
Improvement Program (NIP) offered federal loans and grants to 
municipalities to upgrade municipal services and to finance the 
90Hellyer, TF, 65; Lithwick, 205; Wheeler, Study and Action, 5 
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provision of social and recreational facilities, without 
extensive site clearance, in specially-designated deteriorating 
low- and moderate-income residential neighbourhoods. Its 
companion program, the Residential Rehabilitation Assistance 
Program (RRAP), provided matching federal-provincial grants to 
home-owners and landlords, primarily in NIP areas, to 
rehabilitate low and moderate-income housing. The NIP was 
terminated in 1979 and its successor, the Community Services 
Program, in 1980. 
Given that current federal policy regarding rental housing 
quality is based on only one program, RRAP, and that the funds 
for even that program were reduced by 25% in November, 1984, it 
would seem that additional government intervention to improve 
urban rental quality standards is considered to be of low 
priority. 
3B. Supply 
The second rental problem area which Canadian governments 
addressed, and the one which has commanded the most attention, 
is the supply of units. Given the key role of housing in the 
national economy, it is the federal government which has 
focussed on supply initiatives. As with intervention on 
qualitative problems, attempts to solve the rental problem by 
simply stimulating rental supply appear to have been based on 
confidence in the market's allocative capabilities. Again, the 
connection between income and accessibility to housing was not 
made, and effective demand was not differentiated from social 
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need. 
Despite early and continued documentation of a serious 
shortfall of rental units, there was little government 
intervention before World War II. The city of Toronto co-
sponsored the establishment of the Toronto Housing Company in 
1913 in order to facilitate the construction of dwelling units 
for sale or rent to moderate-income working-class families, but 
it was an isolated experiment and the scale of the project was 
very small. 91 The rental supply provisions of Part II of the 
1938 NHA were, as mentioned above, never used for a number of 
reasons including a lack of federal committment in promoting the 
program and provincial negligence in passing the required 
enabling legislation. 
The federal government became very involved in stimulating 
rental housing supply, however, with the outbreak of the Second 
World War, when the critical shortage of urban housing to 
accommodate war industry workers threatened the war effort. It 
imposed eviction controls on new and existing accommodation in 
all urban centers in 1940. In 1942, it introduced the Home 
Extension Plan which guaranteed private loans to home-owners to 
convert single-family units to multi-family use. In 1944, the 
government itself intervened in conversion activities with the 
1943 Home Conversion Plan, which enabled it to lease, convert, 
and sublet privately-owned buildings in urban centers. In 1944, 
91 The Toronto Housing Co. produced 334 units. Bruce, 75 
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it reinstated the Limited Dividend rental provisions of the 1938 
NHA which had expired in 1940, and which had offered private 
developers long-term, low-interest loans to construct low-rental 
housing. Most importantly, however, enjoying government-mandated 
priority on scarce building materials, the federal crown 
corporation, WHL, constructed 17,190 units for war workers and 
their families between 1941 and 1944. 92 
The return of the war veterans, the post-war population 
boom, and concerns regarding the health of the post-war economy 
kept the federal government active in stimulating rental housing 
supply well into the 1950's. In 1945, the operations of WHL were 
expanded to include construction of rental units for returning 
veterans. Between 1944 and 1948 when the corporation was 
dismantled, WHL constructed 14,323 units for ex-servicemen, 93 
bringing its total contribution of rental units since 1941 to 
well over 31,000. In 1946, loans were made available to primary 
industries to construct rental housing for their employees. In 
1947, in order to help offset declining returns in the rental 
market, the federal government introduced a number of tax system 
subsidies to rental developers, including a double depreciation 
rate on rental housing. The 1948 Rental Insurance Plan provided 
rental investment insurance, and empowered lenders to make 
larger loans to rental projects covered by the insurance. 
Finally, the 1954 NHA contained provisions to facilitate direct 
92 Wade, 47 
93 Wade, 61 
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CMHC construction of new rental housing for armed forces 
personnel, and to encourage the conversion of single- family 
dwellings to multi-family use. It also continued the Limited 
Dividend program established under the 1944 NHA, and replaced 
the joint loan system whereby the federal government had 
participated with private lenders in mortgage financing, by a 
mortgage insurance scheme whereby CMHC would underwrite lenders' 
loans against default. 
Federal action to stimulate rental housing supply fell off 
in the mid-1950's when favourable demographics and economics 
triggered a major apartment construction boom which lasted into 
the early 1970's. Indeed, apartment construction during the 
1960's represented 42% of all residential construction. 94 As 
Figure 2 indicates, at the height of the boom in 1969, apartme~t 
starts accounted for fully 52% of all residential starts. The 
health and vitality of the private rental sector during the 
1960's lent credence to the long-standing assumption that the 
market could produce the required numbers of rental units, 
maintaining federal intervention at low levels for most of the 
period. Aside from the 1957 Small Homes Loan Program, which was 
very small scale, 95 and the 1960 Municipal Sewage Treatment Loan 
Program, which was introduced in acknowledgement of both 
municipal difficulties in financing the servicing of residential 
94 Saywell, 191 
95 The program produced less than 6,000 rental units. Clayton, 
Scenarios, Appendix B. Table B-11 
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land, and the importance of the availability of serviced land to 
housing supply, the Limited Dividend program was virtually the 
only private rental supply program in effect between 1954 and 
1975. 96 Although it successfully stimulated the production of 
101,337 units over the course of its lifetime, 97 its inability 
to produce low-rental units, apparent as early as 1947, 98 
prompted the introduction of the public housing programs which 
will be discussed more fully in the section on affordability. 
In the early 1970's, a combination of factors including 
falling demand for rental housing, and the deteriorating 
economics of rental investment, precipitated the decline of the 
private rental sector. The development of a new gap between the 
costs of developing, financing and operating rental housing 
(financial recovery rents) and market rents even moderate- and 
middle-income renters were willing or able to pay rendered 
private sector rental development increasingly unprofitable. 
(See Table 4} By the 1980's, it was clear that little private 
sector rental development would take 




the absence of 
that which did 
take place would be in the form of luxury units for those who 
96 Even the Limited Dividend program was suspended for four years 
in 1960. 
97 Clayton, Scenarios, Append B., Table B-11 
98 Marsh, Rebuilding, iv; Wade, 60; Marsh, Principles, 235 
99 Green, Vac. Rate SQueeze, 31 
100Shelter for Poor, McLeans, 62 
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could afford to pay near economic rent levels. 100 Indeed, in a 
1982 article in the Financial Post, Richard Shiff, Chairman of 
Bramlea, one of the largest rental developers in Toronto, is 
quoted as saying: 
"'I fully realize that to proceed in the rental market today 
without some form of government assistance would be economic 
suicide.'" 101 
With the decline of the private rental sector in the 
1970's, the federal government again became very involved in 
stimulating rental housing supply, launching three private 
sector rental supply incentive programs designed to bridge the 
gap between financial recovery rent and market rent levels, and 
thus entice private developers back into rental development. It 
also introduced a number of minor private sector supply 
schemes 102 and, given the extension of the affordability problem 
to significant portions of moderate- and middle-income 
households, two non-profit sector supply programs targetted at 
low- and moderate-income renters. The non-profit programs will 
be discussed in the section on affordability. 
The three major private sector incentive programs included 
101 1982, Mkt. Has Potential, S16 
102 The minor programs included a 1975 authorization for CMHC to 
directly finance rental housing in low vacancy areas, the 1975 
Municipal Incentive Grant Program, which offered $1,000/unit 
grants to municipalities approving medium-density moderate-
rental housing, and 1978 conversion loans to facilitate the 
conversion of non-residential buildings to rental units. As 
well, in 1978, the Municipal Infrastructure Program replaced the 
Municipal Sewage Treatment Program. 
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MURB, ARP, and CRSP. The 1974 MURB program, which has been 
credited with stimulating 195,000 multi-family units, 103 
restored a tax system subsidy which had been first introduced in 
the late 1940's and eliminated in 1972. Under the program, 
rental investors were once again permitted to shelter income by 
deducting losses due to Capital Cost Allowances and front-end 
(soft) costs from income from any other source. The 1975 ARP 
replaced the Limited Dividend program. Credited with stimulating 
the production of 122,791 units before being phased out in 
1978, 104 ARP offered private developers initially capital grants 
and later interest-free loans to construct low- and moderate-
rental housing. ARP was followed in 1981 by CRSP, which offered 
private developers interest-free loans to construct moderate-
rental housing in particularly tight market areas. CRSP was 
terminated in 1984, with somewhat in excess of 21,000 units to 
its credit. 105 Currently, there are no private sector rental 
supply incentive programs in operation. 
As the blips in Figure 2 indicate, the three incentive 
programs did succeed in stimulating the supply of multi-family 
dwellings while they were in effect. Apartment starts fell off 
drastically, however, with their withdrawal, and by 1983 
103Dowler, 44 
104 JDH, ARP, 17. Actually, because the provisions permitted the 
stacking of ARP and MURB subsidies, it is difficult to assess 
accurately how many units were produced as a direct result of 
either of the programs. 
105 1984, CMHC, RH Anal, 24 
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represented only 27.1% of all residential starts. (See Figure 2) 
Private sector rental starts accounted for about only 10% of 
those rental starts. 106 Indeed, by 1984, dwellings left. vacant 
by renters purchasing homes were the single most important 
source of available rental units. 107 
3C. Affordability 
Having attempted and failed to solve the rental housing 
problem through isolated quality- and quantity-targetted 
initiatives, government finally intervened in the affordability 
element of the rental housing problem in the 1960's. By the time 
it did, however, the well-documented and long-standing 
affordability problems of lower-income households had become 
even more acute. Both the chronic shortage of rental dwellings 
and the rising costs of constructing new and improving existing 
housing 108 had exaccerbated the problem over the course of the 
century. It has been even further complicated, since the late 
1960's, by the increasingly low-income profile of tenant 
households, such that in 1981, approximately 80% of renters were 
drawn from the first three income quintiles. 109 Moreover, almost 
60% of those renters derived from the lowest two income 
106 Smith, RH Crisis, 60. 10% figure is actually for 1980-81. 
107 CMHC, RM Anal, 7 
108 See T. Adams (1918) "The Housing Problem and Production," 
Conservation of Life, 4(3·), July, p. 54; "House and Apartment 
Construction," p. 53; Task Force on Housing and Urban 
Development, Report, p. 37. 
109 See JDH, Tax Costs, Table 3 
quintiles - the very group the private rental sector has 
traditionally been unable to provide for. 
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Given the early and continued documentation of low- and 
moderate-income rental affordability problems, and the clear 
inability of the private sector to address the issue, government 
responsibility for low-rental assistance has been a major theme 
of the housing reports and conferences of the twentieth century. 
As early as 1917, the Premiers called upon the federal 
government to assist the private sector in constructing working-
class housing. The reports of the 1930's and 1940's were 
unanimous in their recommendations for a large and long-range 
program of publically-assisted low-rental housing to be 
developed by limited dividend corporations or public utility 
companies, and the 1944 Curtis Report recommended that in 
addition to construction assistance, the federal government 
contribute to a rent reduction fund to keep market rents below 
financial recovery rents. Some groups, like the social 
democratic League for Social Reconstruction, even went so far as 
to advocate federal construction, ownership, and management of 
low-rental, non-profit housing. Throughout the 1950's, 1960's 
and 1970's, housing reformers and major housing reports and 
conferences continued to emphasize the need for low-rental 
assistance, recommending aid to co-operative and non-profit 
groups to develop low-rental housing, and a more viable and 
user-responsive public housing program than the ones finally 
introduced in 1949 and 1964. 
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Nevertheless, relatively little action was taken before 
1964, and that which was proved largely ineffectual. The rent 
controls introduced in 1940 - motivated more by concern for the 
war effort than concern for the welfare of low-income renters 1 10 
- were lifted in the early post-war years. The Limited Dividend 
program, did not, as mentioned above, produce low-rental units. 
The municipality of Toronto's 1947 pioneer public housing 
project, Regent Park, was an isolated experiment. And the long-
awaited 1949 public housing program was, as mentioned above, 
scarcely used by the provinces and municipalities. By 1964, only 
12,000 low-rental public housing units, a mere 2.4% of total 
rental starts during the 1950-1964 period (See Table 1), had 
been constructed across Canada, although an estimated 870,000 
low-income households occupied substandard or overcrowded 
housing or paid excessive portions of income to secure more 
adequate housing in 1964. 111 
In the 1960's and 1970's, the federal government finally 
attacked the rental affordability problem. It responded first 
with loans to stimulate the construction of rental housing for 
university students. More importantly, however, with the 1964 
NHA, it extended the limited dividend provisions to non-profit 
organizations willing to construct low-rental housing, 
particularly for the elderly, and introduced an alternate 
formula for the financing of public housing. The improved 
110Wade, 42 
111 Murray, 43. 
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funding of the public housing scheme succeeded in stimulating 
considerable interest in low-rental housing among the provinces, 
who began to establish provincial housing-corporations to 
administer their public housing programs. 112 By 1970, 57,241 
public housing units had been produced through the 1964 program 
compared to a total of only 19,045 through the 1949 program. 113 
Even at those levels, however, the program was small-scale, with 
public housing stock representing less than 1.5% of total 
housing stock in 1971. (See Table 1) Moreover, the poor design 
and minimal amenity standards of public housing projects, the 
low-income profile of project residents, the insensitive 
uprooting of established low-income communities for slum 
clearance and public housing development, and the social stigma 
generally accorded project residents spawned and/or exaccerbated 
serious social pr~blems. 
Following the recommendations of two major federal Task 
Force reports in 1969 and 1972, the federal government began to 
scale down the increasingly costly and problematic public 
housing programs in favour of smaller, scattered and socially-
mixed·low- to moderate-income projects. Accordingly, 1973 
amendments to the NHA extended the non-profit program and 
introduced a continuing co-operative progra~ to facilitate the 
development of social housing projects. In addition to capital 
112 By 1967, eight provinces had done so, signalling the advent 
of a greater provincial presence in the housing field. British 
and Saskatchewan were the exceptions. 
113 1970, CMHC, AR, 26 
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grants and loans, non-profit developers received federal and 
provincial contributions to cover the operating losses sustained 
by offering some units on a rent-geared-to-income basis. As 
well, a private sector rent supplement program, which enabled 
provincial agencies to lease rental units from private landlords 
at prevailing market rents and then rent those units at 25% of 
income to households from the public housing waiting list, was 
established as an alternative to public housing. In 1978, when 
the public housing programs had all but disappeared, the non-
profit and co-operative programs were modified in order to 
reduce federal capital expenditure, the direct CMHC loans and 
grants being replaced by loan insurance on and underwriting of 
loans obtained from private lenders. Currently, the non-profit 
and co-operative social housing programs are the only federal 
rental schemes aimed at the a£fordability problem. 
A 1983 CMHC evaluation of the social housing programs 
suggested they had been successful in overcoming many of the 
problems encountered with the public housing programs. That they 
were faulted, however, for failing to meet low-rental needs -
only 1% bf Canadian households with "core housing need" were 
being served by the program 114 - suggests they have been 
114 Canada, CMHC (1983) Section 56.1 Non-Profit and Co-operative 
Housing Programs Evaluation, Ottawa: CMHC, Program Evaluation 
Division, pp. Abstract, 36, 41. "Core need" households are 
households unable to afford adequate, uncrowded housing without 
paying more than 30% of gross income. Crowding is defined as 
dwellings with more than 1 person/room. Inadequacy is defined as 
dwellings_lacking basic facilities such as piped hot and cold 
water, flush toilet, or exclusive use of a bathtub or shower. 
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seriously underfunded in relation to need. At 1982-83 funding 
levels, in fact, it was estimated that it would take 52 years to 
house all those in need, 115 with no allowance for growing 
numbers of needy households as unemployment steadily climbed and 
social assistance benefits remained stable or fell. Indeed, in 
1981 social housing stock represented only .8% of total Canadian 
housing stock. (See Table 1) Yet the 1981 Census reported that 
30.5% of Canadian renters could not afford market rents at 30% 
of income, with half of those households enduring rent-to-income 
ratios in excess of 50%. 116 Even the 1982 CMHC Annual Report 
noted that: 
"Demand for assistance under all [social housing] programs 
continued to exceed the number provided for in the annual 
budget." 117 
Even the small number of units produced through the social 
housing programs are currently endangered both by restraint and 
by recent moves to turn the administration of and responsibility 
for the programs over to the provinces. As most of the provinces 
have shown little interest in social housing programs in the 
past, 118 this program too may decline or be discontinued at a 
115Where to Go? Falkenhagen, 42-43 
116 CMHC, 1984, RM Anal. 6 
.
1 1 7 1 9 8 2 , CMHC, AR, 1 6 
118 Between 1979 and 1981, for instance, only one quarter of 
committed Section 56.1 units received provincial assistance as 
well as federal, with special care units receiving almost one-
half of that assistance. The co-operative program, which targets 
moderate-income households most specifically, received the least 
additional assistance. Section 56.1 Eval, 267, 269 





In summary, the affordability of rental housing has always 
been the crucial issue in rental housing problems. When the 
opportunity arose in the early twentieth century to do something 
about supplying good quality, affordable rental housing, 
however, government did not take it up, both because of the 
constraints outlined in Section 1 and because of the inadequate 
definition of the problem. Instead, it attacked the problem with 
incremental, ad hoc and short-term measures, which focussed 
first on one aspect of the problem, then an another. As a 
result, the qualitative problems of the nation's housing stock 
appear to have been worked out, in that, except in rural areas 
and on reservations, Canada now has very few poor quality 
housing units. A recent CMHC estimate suggested that less than 
3% of rental dwellings are presently overcrowded or of poor 
quality. 119 As well, the quantitative problems of developing a 
construction industry capable of supplying the required numbers 
of units appear to have been worked out, in that the residential 
construction sector is now capable of supplying a tremendous 
number of units. However, the rental market responds only to 
effective demand, not social need, and Canada's social need for 
rental housing today far outpaces the effective demand in the 
rental market. Rental housing, therefore, remains unaffordable 
to most low- and many moderate-income renters. Moreover, 
production of all but very expensive rental units has virtually 
119 CMHC, Section 56.1 Program Evaluation; Table 3.1 p.36. 
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ceased because rental housing cannot be supplied at financial 
recovery rent levels affordable to low- and moderate-income 
renters. Only now, after all these years of ad hoc government 
activity in the rental sector, do we realize we are still in the 
same bind - a substantial percentage of our renter population is 
unable to afford good quality rental housing. 
The rental programs of the past fifty years show a 
remarkable consistency in that they have, for the most part, 
been market-supportive, ad hoc, and minimal measures. Yet with 
the increasingly low-income profile of the renter population and 
the steadily rising costs of producing rental housing, it is 
apparent that we cannot continue to rely on the same approach to 
rental housing policy as we have in the past. No private sector 
incentive program has yet been successful in producing rental 
units affordable to low-income renters. Moreover, it is obvious 
that one underfunded social housing program cannot meet the 
tremendous social need. Increasing the incomes of low and 
moderate-income renters could go a long way towards resolving 
the longstanding affordability problem. Yet changing the income 
distribution of Canadian society is a monumental challenge. Even 
with the redistributive programs of the post-war Welfare State, 
the income distribution of the early 1950's has remained 
essentially static. 120 
120See D.P. Ross (1980) The Canadian Fact Book on Income 
distribution, Ottawa: CCSD, p.12; Canada, Statistics Canada 
(1979) Income Distribution by Size. 
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We must concentrate on the possible. This paper does not 
claim a solution. It's main point is that in viewing rental 
problems and policy options in the past, we have been 
constrained. Removing those constraints can open up new options. 
We must rethink the conventional assumptions regarding the 
capabilities of the market and the role of rental housing in 
Canadian society which underly our rental housing policy. We 
must also think in terms of a long-term and comprehensive 
housing policy. Had we implemented such a policy in the 1930's, 
we would today have a substantial stock of adequate low- and 
moderate-rental housing, and we would be concentrating on 
rehabilitation to keep that stock in good repair rather than on 
trying to find ways to house the more than one-half million 
Canadian renter households with housing problems. 121 
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